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An investigation by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists found that A7’s international payment network begins with cash collected at Moscow markets, including Sadovod. The service routes funds through Promsvyazbank, cryptocurrency intermediaries in Kyrgyzstan and companies in other countries; the investigation says A7 processed at least 58 metric tons of cash in one month at its peak.
An investigation by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) has traced the start of international transfers through Russia’s A7 payment service to bags of rubles collected at Moscow markets. The report says A7’s network moves the cash through Promsvyazbank, cryptocurrency intermediaries in Kyrgyzstan and companies in other countries, and handled at least 58 metric tons in a single month at its peak.
ICIJ journalists reviewed internal company documents and spoke with sources for the investigation, published in late October. They report that A7’s cash collection points include several Moscow wholesale and retail markets, with Sadovod described as the largest. A7 records call the collection points “departments”; the documents identify at least eight. Vendors bring in cash, which brokers count, pack into numbered bags and send by van with payment orders to a processing center elsewhere in Moscow.
At that center, about 50 cashiers record the money in A7’s counting system, according to the report. The cash is then delivered to Promsvyazbank (PSB), which stores it and credits A7’s accounts. A7 uses companies registered abroad to move funds onward: intermediaries in Kyrgyzstan buy cryptocurrency through Grinex, an exchange the investigation links to A7, before other intermediaries convert it into local currencies and pay recipients in third countries. The report says destinations are often in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.
The described system matters because it offers a route for cross-border payments after sanctions and the removal of Russian banks from SWIFT disrupted conventional transfers. ICIJ’s findings describe how the network operates; they do not, by themselves, establish that every payment through A7 is unlawful or that every named client is engaged in sanctions evasion.
How A7 Moves Money Abroad
The reporting illustrates how a Russian payment intermediary can connect a cash-based collection network to international recipients using banks, cryptocurrency and foreign companies. That structure may make the origin and movement of funds harder for outside institutions to identify, a concern for sanctions enforcement and financial oversight.
The investigation also describes a substantial operation rather than an isolated transfer service. A7’s reported peak of at least 58 metric tons of cash in one month gives a sense of the physical scale involved, although the supplied report does not specify the month or provide a comparison period. A source familiar with the business told ICIJ that Sadovod offers a large base of customers and cash transactions.
For readers, the central point is the gap between formal restrictions on Russian financial links and the practical routes businesses can use to send money abroad. The reporting provides details about one such route, while the precise volume and legal status of individual payments remain separate questions.
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Sanctions and A7’s Ownership
A7 emerged as sanctions against Russian banks and payment systems, including disconnection from SWIFT after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, made cross-border transfers more difficult. Investigative outlet Proekt reported in spring 2026 that shadow payment intermediaries had established offices in Moscow City. It identified A7 as the largest player in that market, a description also supported by sources cited in the supplied reporting.
A7 is controlled by Moldovan businessman Ilan Shor, who was convicted of fraud and embezzlement in Moldova. Russia’s state-owned Promsvyazbank holds the remaining 49 percent. PSB became the designated bank for Russia’s Defense Ministry and defense industry in late 2019, according to the source material. The state development corporation VEB.RF provides support to A7, the reporting says.
Proekt reported that at least 25 A7 clients were under U.S. and EU sanctions, including five companies that make or supply combat drones used by Russia’s military in Ukraine. The material also names other clients, including retailers and industrial firms. These are findings about companies on a client list obtained by Proekt; they should not be read as proof that each client used A7 for a particular prohibited transaction.
““Sadovod is simply a big client base.””
— A source familiar with the situation, speaking to ICIJ
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What the Investigation Does Not Establish
The supplied material does not identify the date of the month when A7 reportedly processed at least 58 metric tons of cash, nor does it give a currency value for that volume. It also does not provide a full breakdown of A7’s transfers by destination, customer or purpose, so the total amount of money moved through the described route is not clear.
The investigation describes a system used to route payments around obstacles created by sanctions, but the supplied reporting does not show that every transfer violated a specific law or sanctions rule. A company appearing on a client list is not, on its own, evidence of a particular unlawful transaction. Claims about potential involvement by Roman Abramovich are also disputed: Proekt cited sources and circumstantial links, while his representatives denied that he was involved.
Further detail about the underlying documents, the period covered by the cash totals and any official response from A7 or PSB is not included in the source material provided here. Those gaps limit what can be concluded about the network’s current activity and the legal status of individual payments.
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Further Scrutiny of A7’s Network
The published investigation adds detail to earlier reporting about A7 and the shadow payments market, but the supplied material does not announce a new enforcement action or give a timetable for one. The next developments to watch are any responses from A7, Promsvyazbank or relevant authorities, as well as additional reporting or public records that clarify the network’s transactions and the dates covered by its reported cash volumes.
Any assessment of sanctions compliance will depend on evidence about particular payments, counterparties and jurisdictions, rather than the existence of the cash-collection system alone. Until further information is available, the scale and mechanics described by ICIJ are reported findings, while the full reach and legal consequences of A7’s activity remain unresolved.
Key Questions
What did the ICIJ investigation report about A7?
It reported that A7’s international payment network begins with cash collected at Moscow markets and uses banks, cryptocurrency intermediaries and foreign companies to route payments to recipients abroad.
How much cash did A7 process at its reported peak?
The source material says A7 processed at least 58 metric tons in one month at its peak. It does not identify the month or state the cash’s total monetary value.
How does the reported transfer route work?
Cash is collected and counted in Moscow, then delivered to Promsvyazbank. A7’s foreign intermediaries use cryptocurrency transactions in Kyrgyzstan and other companies abroad before funds are converted into local currency and sent to recipients.
Does the reporting prove that every A7 transaction broke sanctions?
No. The investigation describes a network designed to handle transfers amid sanctions restrictions, but the supplied material does not establish that every payment violated a specific rule. Each transaction’s legality depends on its parties, route and purpose.
Who owns A7?
The source material says Moldovan businessman Ilan Shor controls A7, while Russia’s state-owned Promsvyazbank owns the remaining 49 percent. It also says VEB.RF provides support to the company.
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